The Future of Financial Advice: Eliminating the False Distinction Between Brokers and Investment Advisers by Lazaro, Christine
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 87 
Number 2 Volume 87, Spring-Summer 2013, 
Numbers 2-3 
Article 4 
April 2014 
The Future of Financial Advice: Eliminating the False Distinction 
Between Brokers and Investment Advisers 
Christine Lazaro 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Lazaro, Christine (2013) "The Future of Financial Advice: Eliminating the False Distinction Between 
Brokers and Investment Advisers," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 87 : No. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol87/iss2/4 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
FINAL_LAZARO 2/27/2014 6:21 PM 
 
381 
THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL ADVICE: 
ELIMINATING THE FALSE DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN BROKERS AND INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS 
CHRISTINE LAZARO† 
The individuals who effectuate securities transactions and 
offer financial advice to the public are regulated at several 
levels—by federal statute, by state law, and by rules of federal 
regulators, including the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) and self-regulatory organizations.  Following the stock 
market crash of 1929, Congress began to enact a federal 
framework of regulation of the securities markets and the 
individuals working within the securities markets.  Initially, 
Congress focused on brokers, the individuals who were paid to 
effectuate securities transactions.1  Next, Congress focused on 
investment advisers, the individuals who were paid for the advice 
they gave in connection with securities transactions.2 
The SEC is responsible for implementing the regulatory 
schemes for both brokers and investment advisers.  The SEC 
directly regulates investment advisers.3  Brokers are indirectly 
regulated by the SEC and primarily regulated by the Financial  
 
 
 
 
† Acting Director of the Securities Arbitration Clinic at St. John’s University 
School of Law. I would like to thank Teresa Grogan and Mark Movsesian for their 
helpful comments and Adam Heckler, J.D., 2012, St. John’s University School of 
Law, for his research assistance and help editing this Article. 
1 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012); Thomas Lee Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties 
and the Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 47, 50 (2011). 
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2012); Hazen, supra note 1. 
3 See James T. Koebel, Trust and the Investment Adviser Industry: Congress’ 
Failure To Realize FINRA’s Potential To Restore Investor Confidence, 35 SETON 
HALL LEGIS. J. 61, 64–65 (2010); Ross Jordan, Note, Thinking Before Rulemaking: 
Why the SEC Should Think Twice Before Imposing a Uniform Fiduciary Standard 
on Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 491, 494–95 
(2012). 
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Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), one of the self-
regulatory organizations for which the SEC has oversight 
responsibility.4 
The regulatory schemes associated with the SEC and FINRA 
are separate and distinct.  The standard of care applicable to 
brokers is limited in scope and time to the transaction they are 
effectuating.5  Pursuant to rules promulgated by FINRA, brokers 
must make suitable recommendations to their clients, execute 
orders promptly, disclose certain material information, charge 
prices reasonably related to the prevailing market, and fully 
disclose any conflict of interest.6  Brokers are not fiduciaries of 
their clients and their duties to their clients end once the 
transaction is completed.7  Brokers have no obligation to provide 
any ongoing advice to their clients nor are they obligated to 
monitor their clients’ accounts.8  Brokers are obligated to observe 
high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable 
principles of trade.9  On the other hand, investment advisers are 
held to a higher standard of care.  Investment advisers are 
deemed fiduciaries and are expected to act in their clients’ best 
interests at all times.10  The advice they give is ongoing and, 
accordingly, the standard of care applicable to their interactions 
with their clients is ongoing.11  Investment advisers are expected 
to monitor their clients’ accounts and provide advice as 
appropriate.12 
Over time, the distinctions between brokers and investment 
advisers have blurred.  Effectuating transactions and offering 
advice are no longer distinct activities conducted by different 
individuals.  Brokers offer advice and seek compensation for the 
 
4 See Koebel, supra note 3; Jordan, supra note 3. 
5 See Jordan, supra note 3, at 501. 
6 See id. at 501–02. 
7 See Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment 
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 716, 719, 726–27 (2010) [hereinafter Laby, Fiduciary 
Obligations]. 
8 See id. at 728. 
9 FINRA Rule 2010 (2008), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/ 
display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=5504. 
10 See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 7, at 718; Jordan, supra note 3, 
at 502–03. 
11 See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 7, at 728. 
12 Id. 
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advice they give to clients.13  Aware that brokers were beginning 
to conduct activities which might bring them under the purview 
of the regulations governing investment advisers, the SEC 
attempted to carve out exceptions to the regulations for brokers.14  
However, the SEC has been unsuccessful in this regard when 
challenged in court.15  Now, an individual offering financial 
advice may be both a broker and an investment adviser and offer 
different levels of service to different clients.  This individual will 
be governed by the regulations associated with brokers when 
acting in the capacity of a broker and will be governed by the 
regulations associated with investment advisers when acting in 
the capacity of an investment adviser.16  This has blurred the 
distinctions even further, as the same person may be both.17 
Concerned that the distinctions between brokers and 
investment advisers have blurred too far, a number of studies, 
including several commissioned by the SEC, have examined an 
investor’s comprehension of the distinctions.  The studies have 
consistently demonstrated that investors do not understand the 
different roles of brokers and investment advisers.18  Investors do 
not understand that the conduct of brokers and investment 
advisers are governed by different regulatory schemes and by 
different standards of care.19  Investors do not always understand 
with whom they are doing business.20 
The SEC was not the only entity concerned that the 
investing public may not understand who is offering them advice 
and what responsibilities attach to such individuals.  In 2010, as 
part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Congress decided to take a closer 
look at the legislation and regulations governing the 
relationships between brokers and investment advisers and their 
 
13 See Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and 
Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 400–01 (2009) [hereinafter Laby, Reforming 
the Regulation]. 
14 See id. at 403. 
15 See Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Laby, 
Reforming the Regulation, supra note 13, at 410–12. 
16 See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 7, at 715. 
17 See id. 
18 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND 
BROKER-DEALERS i (2011), [hereinafter SEC STUDY], available at http://www.sec.gov 
/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
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clients.21  As a result, it tasked the SEC with examining this 
relationship and determining if any action need be taken.22  The 
SEC completed a comprehensive study that examined these 
issues and made recommendations (the “Study”).23 
The Study issued by the staff of the SEC recognized that 
there is widespread confusion among investors about both the 
differences between brokers and investment advisers and the 
differing standards of liability that are applicable to each.24  As a 
result, the Study recommended harmonizing the standards 
applicable to brokers and investment advisers when providing 
personalized investment advice about securities.25  However, the 
Study specifically did not advocate adopting a standard for 
brokers that would be ongoing.26  The standard of care proposed 
would still be limited in time.27  Accordingly, it would not mirror 
the scope of the standard applicable to investment advisers. 
Rather than adopt the recommendations proposed by the 
SEC, this Article proposes that the best course of action at this 
point is to adopt new legislation—a Financial Advice Act.  While 
the distinctions between brokers and investment advisers have 
blurred, there remain distinctions.  A one-size-fits-all regulatory 
structure will disregard the realities of the marketplace.  
Different clients have different needs and expectations from their 
financial professionals and want different fee structures which 
reflect the different services.  Accordingly, the Financial Advice 
Act would not harmonize the standards applicable to brokers and 
investment advisers.  It would eliminate the artificial 
distinctions between brokers and investment advisers as they 
now exist, and replace them with new definitions more closely 
tied to the services actually offered by the financial professional.  
It would recognize that there are varying levels of financial 
advice with different compensation associated with them.  It 
would create standards of care that are more closely related to 
the advice and the expectations created by the financial 
professional.  Clients would have the option of choosing to do 
 
21 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1824 (2010). 
22 See id. at 182427. 
23 See generally SEC STUDY, supra note 18. 
24 See id. at 101. 
25 See id. at 132. 
26 Id. at 165–66. 
27 Id. 
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business with a full range of financial professionals from discount 
to full service, and would receive a corresponding level of 
protection. 
In order to set the stage for the discussion of this Article’s 
proposal, this Article first examines the legislative history of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940, and second, the judicial history of both.  The 
circumstances in which each Act was formed explain why the 
Acts were initially distinct and inform the discussion of why 
those distinctions are no longer applicable.  Next, this Article 
examines how the SEC has attempted to deal with the blurring 
of the distinctions in a way that would permit the financial 
professionals to offer various advice models to clients.  By 
ensuring that there remain definable distinctions between 
brokers and investment advisers, the courts have further blurred 
the landscape. 
Next this Article examines Congress’s attempt to deal with 
this blurring of roles, and the effect Dodd-Frank has had on this 
landscape.  It will explore the Study conducted by the SEC 
pursuant to Dodd-Frank and the recommendations made by the 
staff of the SEC.  Lastly, this Article will describe a proposal for a 
new securities act, which would modify the existing legislation in 
such a way to eliminate the artificial distinctions between 
brokers and investment advisers. 
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACTS FOR 
BROKERS AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
In order to comprehensively evaluate the weaknesses in the 
current regulatory structure governing the provision of financial 
advice, it is important to understand the environment in which 
the applicable statutes were initially enacted.  Prior to the 
enactment of federal securities laws, the offering of securities 
was governed by the states or by stock exchanges.28  It was not 
until the early part of the twentieth century that investments in 
securities became widespread to the general public.29 
 
28 Sean M. O’Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Accountants and 
Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. REV. 741, 794–95 
(2004). 
29 Id. at 778. 
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During World War I, the U.S. Government began offering 
Liberty Bonds, creating a broad public interest in securities.30  
Following the War, the 1920s were a boom period in the United 
States, during which time an “unhealthy volume of credit was 
sucked into securities markets to the deprivation of agriculture, 
commerce, and industry,” causing widespread securities 
inflation.31 
The post-war boom in stocks also attracted . . . the attention of 
private individuals who up to that time had been more likely to 
put their funds in savings banks, mortgages, local investments, 
the managers of which they knew personally, or which were 
such a factor in their surroundings, their neighborhood, that 
they felt some confidence in them.32 
By 1934, “nearly one half of the entire national wealth of the 
country [was] represented by corporate stocks and corporate and 
Government bonds”; however, “nearly one half of that corporate 
wealth [was] vested in the 200 largest nonbanking 
corporations.”33  Corporate ownership was now vested in the 
hands of a large number of investors, separating ownership of the 
corporations from control of the corporations.  It was estimated 
that more than “10,000,000 individual men and women in the 
United States [were] the direct possessors of stocks and bonds.”34 
As more money went into the securities markets, the value of 
stocks increased, creating a bubble that inevitably burst in 
October 1929.  “The market value of all stocks listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange slumped from $89,000,000,000 on 
September 1, 1929, to $15,000,000,000 on July 1, 1932,”35 a drop 
of more than eighty percent.  Throughout this time period, it was 
clear that securities markets were occupying a much more 
significant place in the day-to-day workings of the country, yet 
there was little to no oversight.  This had to change. 
Stock exchanges which handle the distribution and trading of a 
very substantial part of the entire national wealth and which 
have developed a technique of sucking funds from every corner 
of the country cannot operate under the same traditions and  
 
 
30 Id. at 796. 
31 S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 3 (1934). 
32 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INV. TRUSTS AND INV. COS. 4 (1939). 
33 H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 3 (1934). 
34 Id. 
35 S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 3. 
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practices as pre-war stock exchanges which handled 
substantially only the transactions of professional investors and 
speculators.36 
Following the crash of the stock market in 1929, Congress 
examined the lack of oversight of the securities industry.  
Initially, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933.37  This 
statute has two primary goals: (1) to ensure that investors 
receive full disclosure in connection with securities being offered 
for public sale; and (2) to prohibit fraud in connection with the 
sale of securities.38  The Act focuses primarily on the issuance of 
securities.  Because the Act does not deal with the oversight of 
brokers or investment advisers, this Act will not be discussed in 
this Article.  The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 would deal 
with the secondary markets in which securities trade. 
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
As the country delved further into the Great Depression, 
President Roosevelt tasked Congress with enacting legislation 
“providing for the regulation by the Federal Government of the 
operations of exchanges dealing in securities and commodities for 
the protection of investors, for the safeguarding of values, 
and . . . for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise, and 
destructive speculation.”39  In response, Congress adopted the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”).40 
The 1934 Act was proposed to combat the issues coming out 
of the Great Depression.  The cure had to be widespread if there 
was any possibility of it being effective.  “Speculation, 
manipulation, faulty credit control, investors’ ignorance, and 
disregard of trust relationships by those whom the law should 
regard as fiduciaries, are all a single seamless web.  No one of 
these evils can be isolated for cure of itself alone.”41  The 1934 Act 
was meant to deal with three principal problems: (1) “the 
excessive use of credit for speculation,” (2) “the unfair practices  
 
 
36 H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 4. 
37 See generally Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74. 
38 The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last modified Oct. 1, 2013). 
39 S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 2 (1934). 
40 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78a–78pp (2012). 
41 H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 6. 
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employed in speculation,” and (3) “the secrecy surrounding the 
financial condition of corporations which invite the public to 
purchase their securities.”42 
Congress was concerned primarily with two practices of 
brokers.  The first was the extension of margin credit.43  Brokers 
were lending their clients’ money, which they had borrowed from 
a bank or another broker, so that their clients could speculate in 
the market.   
The ease and celerity with which such a transaction is 
arranged, and the absence of any scrutiny by the broker of the 
personal credit of the borrower, encourage the purchase of 
securities by persons with insufficient resources to protect their 
accounts in the event of a decline in the value of the securities 
purchased.44 
The second concern was the commingling of broker and 
dealer functions.45   
[A] broker who deals in securities for his own account finds it 
difficult to give disinterested advice to a customer with regard 
to the securities the customer seeks to buy.  However honest the 
broker’s intentions may be, it is argued that he should be placed 
beyond temptation, by a complete segregation of the broker and 
dealer functions.46   
However, the committee declined to take such action.  Instead, 
the committee recommended that one situation in which broker 
and dealer functions were combined should be eliminated.47  The 
committee recommended prohibiting a broker from effecting “any 
transaction involving the sale on margin, of a security in the 
distribution of which he has participated during the preceding 6 
months.”48  Additionally, the proposed bill required brokers to 
disclose in writing to their customers any interest the broker had 
in the transaction.49 
 
 
42 S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 5. 
43 Id. at 6–7. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 11–12. 
46 Id. at 11. 
47 Id. at 12. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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The 1934 Act created the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.50  The SEC was created so that there would be 
flexibility in the implementation of the statute.  Congress 
recognized,  
so delicate a mechanism as the modern stock exchange cannot 
be regulated efficiently under a rigid statutory program.  Unless 
considerable latitude is allowed for the exercise of 
administrative discretion, it is impossible to avoid, on the one 
hand, unworkable ‘strait-jacket’ regulation and, on the other, 
loopholes which may be penetrated by slight variations in the 
method of doing business.  Accordingly it is essential to entrust 
the administration of the act to an agency vested with power to 
eliminate undue hardship and to prevent and punish evasion.51 
Throughout the 1934 Act, the SEC is empowered with the 
ability to create rules that would govern how the 1934 Act is 
implemented.52  The 1934 Act contains a broad antifraud 
provision, which provides the following:53 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or 
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange[] 
. . . . 
(b) [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any 
security not so registered, or any securities-based swap 
agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors.54 
The wording of the statute is broad and leaves the SEC with 
the responsibility to develop rules and regulations defining the 
conduct it deems unacceptable.  The SEC in turn promulgated 
Rule 10b-5, which broadly prohibits fraud in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities.55 
 
50 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012). 
51 S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 5 (1934). 
52 See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified June 10, 2013) (“The Act 
empowers the SEC with broad authority over all aspects of the securities industry.”). 
53 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
54 Id. 
55 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). Rule 10b-5 states the following:  
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The 1934 Act also gave the SEC broad authority over the 
securities industry, including the power to “register, regulate, 
and oversee brokerage firms”56 as well as brokers.  Under the 
1934 Act, a broker is defined as “any person engaged in the 
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of 
others.”57  In 1938, the Maloney Act amended the 1934 Act to 
provide for a system of self-regulation of brokerage firms.58  The 
section permitted the registration of an association of brokers 
and dealers as a national securities association.59  Only one such 
association has ever registered pursuant to this section—the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), which is 
today known as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.60  
Under the watch of the SEC, FINRA has the primary 
responsibility of regulating brokers and writing and enforcing 
rules for every broker in the United States.61 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange,  
(a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,  
(b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or  
(c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.  
Id. 
56 The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 38. 
57 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A). 
58 See id. § 78o-3. 
59 Id. § 78o-3(a). 
60 In 2007, FINRA was created through the consolidation of NASD and the 
member regulation, enforcement, and arbitration operations of the New York Stock 
Exchange. Press Release, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine To Form 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority—FINRA, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. 
(July 30, 2007), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/ 
P036329. Today, it is the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing 
business in the United States, and it oversees over 4,000 brokerage firms and over 
600,000 registered securities representatives. About the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/ 
AboutFINRA/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
61 GET TO KNOW US, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. (2012), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/documents/corporate/p1186
67.pdf. 
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B. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
Congress was not finished when it enacted the 1934 Act, 
however.  It continued to evaluate the securities markets to 
determine whether additional legislation was necessary.  In 
1939, the SEC submitted a report to Congress on Investment 
Trusts and Investment Companies.62  As discussed above, 
following World War I, stock ownership had become more 
widespread.  Consequentially, a need for investment counsel 
arose.63  Very few investment counselor firms existed prior to 
1919.  Investors had other sources of advice available to them, 
and a number were  
completely satisfied with the fact that they were being given 
competent and sound advice by the investment banking houses.  
The brokers were more of a secondary source of advice, while 
the banking houses knew quite a bit about bonds and not so 
much as a rule about stocks, the brokers knew more about 
stocks and very little about bonds insofar as their function was 
concerned.  Their attention was centered on the more active 
stocks, per se, to some extent.64   
It was recognized that although many different sources of advice 
existed, there was “no one to whom [an investor] could turn and 
retain professionally the way he would retain a lawyer on a 
technical problem where he was up against technical men on the 
other side who knew more than he did.”65 
Issues arose, because at this point, investment counselors 
were not regulated broadly.  There were a handful of small 
organizations that investment counselors could join; however, 
there was no requirement that an investment counselor be a 
member of any organization.66  The standards were disparate, 
“[a]lthough in the majority of cases the personnel of investment 
counsel firms had had some experience in the security brokerage 
business or in the financial field, definite or uniform standards of 
 
62 See generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT 
COMPANIES: REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 30 OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935 (1939). 
63 Throughout the SEC’s report, the term “investment counselor” was used. 
However, in the Act, this term was replaced with “investment adviser.” For clarity 
purposes, this Article will use the term “investment counselor” when referring to the 
SEC’s report. 
64 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 62, at 3. 
65 Id. at 4–5. 
66 Id. at 4. 
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training for employees were almost never laid down.”67  As a 
result, “individuals without the requisite qualifications and 
financial responsibility who indulged in exaggerated claims 
constituted a menace not only to the investor but to the 
counselors.”68 
Representatives of investment counselors recognized that 
their function was the “furnishing to clients on a personal basis 
competent, unbiased, and continuous advice regarding the sound 
management of their investments” and they could not do this 
“unless all conflicts of interest between the investment counsel 
and the client were removed.”69  One such conflict arose from the 
intermingling of functions between investment counselors and 
brokers.  Investment counselors were concerned that affiliations 
between investment counselor firms and brokers  
fostered undesirable and irreconcilable conflicts of interest, for 
“the broker receives his income principally or entirely from the 
commissions received on transactions—the larger the number of 
transactions the larger his gross income” and “the broker’s 
interest in turnover might be a temptation to advise clients to 
trade more than might be to their advantage or than might be 
necessary in their interest.”70 
The report provided by the SEC demonstrated the need for 
the adoption of legislation aimed at regulating investment 
counselors.  Accordingly, in 1940, Congress adopted the 
Investment Advisers Act (the “Advisers Act”).71  “The nature of 
the functions of investment advisers, their increasing widespread 
activities, their potential influence on security markets and the 
dangerous potentialities of stock market tipsters imposing upon 
unsophisticated investors, convinces this committee that 
protection of investors requires the regulation of investment 
advisers on a national scale.”72 
The Advisers Act requires that firms or individuals who 
provide investment advice must register with the SEC.73  The 
Advisers Act defines an investment adviser as  
 
67 Id. at 16. 
68 Id. at 28. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 29 (footnote omitted). 
71 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2012). 
72 S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 21 (1940). 
73 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3. 
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any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of 
advising others, either directly or through publications or 
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of 
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for 
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or 
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.74   
Specifically exempted from the definition of investment adviser is 
“any broker or dealer whose performance of such services is 
solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or 
dealer and who receives no special compensation therefor.”75 
Like the 1934 Act, the Advisers Act prohibits fraud and 
deceptive practices on the part of an investment adviser.  Unlike 
the 1934 Act, the Advisers Act is more explicit in the conduct it 
prohibits:76 
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the 
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, 
directly or indirectly— 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any 
client or prospective client; 
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business 
which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or 
prospective client; 
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any 
security to or purchase any security from a client, or acting as 
broker for a person other than such client, knowingly to effect 
any sale or purchase of any security for the account of such 
client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the 
completion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting 
and obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction.  The 
prohibitions of this paragraph shall not apply to any transaction 
with a customer of a broker or dealer if such broker or dealer is 
not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such 
transaction; or 
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is 
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.  The Commission shall, 
for the purposes of this paragraph (4) by rules and regulations 
define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, 
such acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative.77 
 
74 Id. § 80b-2(a)(11). 
75 Id. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C). 
76 Id. § 80b-6. 
77 Id. 
FINAL_LAZARO 2/27/2014  6:21 PM 
394 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:381   
Unlike the 1934 Act, the Advisers Act does not leave it to the 
SEC to define the conduct it deems unacceptable.78  The SEC, 
however, does have the authority to enact rules governing 
investment advisers and has the primary responsibility for 
regulating the conduct of investment advisers.79 
II. THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACTS FOR 
BROKERS AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
The standards of care, which were set forth by both the 1934 
Act and the Advisers Act, were not clear.  Although both statutes 
contain separate antifraud provisions, the courts have 
interpreted each provision differently.  This has led to disparities 
in the obligations of brokers and investment advisers, even 
though both statutes aimed to prevent fraudulent conduct.  Over 
time, courts interpreted the antifraud section of the Advisers Act 
to establish a federal fiduciary duty on the part of investment 
advisers, while the antifraud section of the 1934 Act was said to 
have established no such duty on the part of brokers.80 
To determine the standard of care associated with each Act, 
the courts considered the level of scienter necessary to find a 
violation of each Act’s antifraud provision.81  In 1963, the 
Supreme Court considered the relationship between an 
investment adviser and a client, and concluded that the 
relationship was fiduciary in nature.82  Justice Goldberg, writing 
for the majority, stated, 
And the Committee Reports indicate a desire to preserve ‘the 
personalized character of the services of investment advisers,’ 
and to eliminate conflicts of interest between the investment 
adviser and the clients as safeguards both to ‘unsophisticated 
investors’ and to ‘bona fide investment counsel.’  The 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a congressional 
recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment 
 
78 See id. 
79 Id. § 80b-11. 
80 Compare SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 
(1963) (holding that under the Advisers Act, a relationship between an investment 
advisor and a client is fiduciary in nature), with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (holding that scienter is a necessary element of the antifraud 
section of the 1934 Act and therefore it does not confer a fiduciary duty on brokers). 
81 See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193; Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 
at 191–92. 
82 Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 191. 
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advisory relationship,’ as well as a congressional intent to 
eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest which 
might incline as investment adviser—consciously or 
unconsciously—to render advice which was not disinterested.  It 
would defeat the manifest purpose of the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 for us to hold, therefore, that Congress, in 
empowering the courts to enjoin any practice which operates ‘as 
a fraud or deceit,’ intended to require proof of intent to injure 
and actual injury to clients.83 
In considering a breach of this fiduciary duty, the Court 
determined that the motivation of the investment adviser was 
not relevant.84  “It misconceives the purpose of the statute to 
confine its application to ‘dishonest’ as opposed to ‘honest’ 
motives.”85 
With respect to section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the courts have 
determined that, because scienter is a necessary element to find 
a violation of the section, the section does not confer a fiduciary 
duty on brokers.86  As explained by the Supreme Court, “Section 
10(b) makes unlawful the use or employment of ‘any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance’ in contravention 
of Commission rules.  The words ‘manipulative or deceptive’ used 
in conjunction with ‘device or contrivance’ strongly suggest that 
[section] 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional 
conduct.”87 
The Court also considered whether or not Rule 10b-5 may 
cover negligent acts, determining that it could not.88  The Court 
recognized that Rule 10b-5 was enacted by the SEC pursuant to 
authority granted to it by section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.89  “Thus 
despite the broad view of the Rule advanced by the Commission 
in this case, its scope cannot exceed the power granted the 
Commission by Congress under [section] 10(b).”90  Accordingly, 
both section 10(b), and Rule 10b-5 require a finding of scienter, 
foreclosing liability for negligent violation of either. 
 
83 Id. at 191–92. 
84 Id. at 192. 
85 Id. at 201 (footnotes omitted). 
86 See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201. 
87 Id. at 197. 
88 Id. at 201. 
89 Id. at 212–13. 
90 Id. at 214. 
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In addition to the scope of the standard of care an 
investment adviser owes a client, the recourse available to clients 
for a violation of the standard is also an important consideration.  
In 1979, the Court revisited the issues regarding the standards of 
care applicable to investment advisers when it determined 
whether or not Congress intended investors to have a private 
right of action for violations of the Advisers Act.91  The Court 
recognized that section 206 of the Advisers Act “establishes 
‘federal fiduciary standards’ to govern the conduct of investment 
advisers.”92  Notwithstanding the broad purposes of investor 
protection which were behind each of the securities acts enacted 
following the Great Depression, the Court determined that 
investors did not have the right to pursue monetary damages 
under the statute beyond that contemplated by section 215.93  
The Court held “that when Congress declared in § 215 that 
certain contracts are void, it intended that the customary legal 
incidents of voidness would follow, including the availability of a 
suit for rescission or for an injunction against continued 
operation of the contract, and for restitution.”94  However, the 
Court found that Congress had failed to clearly express an 
intended private right of action for violations of section 206.95  
Accordingly, the Court held that “there exists a limited private 
remedy under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to void an 
investment advisers contract, but that the Act confers no other 
private causes of action, legal or equitable.”96 
The courts have found, however, that investors do have a 
private right of action for violations of section 10(b), 
notwithstanding that it contains no explicit assertion of such a 
right.  The Court has recognized that  
[a]lthough [section] 10(b) does not by its terms create an express 
civil remedy for its violation, and there is no indication that 
Congress, or the Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5, 
contemplated such a remedy, the existence of a private cause of 
action for violations of the statute and the Rule is now well 
established.97   
 
91 Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 12–13 (1979). 
92 Id. at 17 (citations omitted). 
93 Id. at 18. 
94 Id. at 19. 
95 Id. at 19–20. 
96 Id. at 24. 
97 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (footnotes omitted). 
FINAL_LAZARO 2/27/2014  6:21 PM 
2013] ELIMINATING THE FALSE DISTINCTION 397 
In a later case, the Court explained further that “[j]udicial 
interpretation and application, legislative acquiescence, and the 
passage of time have removed any doubt that a private cause of 
action exists for a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and 
constitutes an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act’s 
requirements.”98  With respect to section 10(b), the Court was 
more concerned with the intent of the wrongdoer than it was 
when dealing with investment advisers, even though the 
legislative history of the 1934 Act barely discussed the scope of 
10(b).  The Court reasoned,  
Although the extensive legislative history of the 1934 Act is 
bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress’ intent, we think 
the relevant portions of that history support our conclusion that 
[section] 10(b) was addressed to practices that involve some 
element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for 
negligent conduct alone.99 
III. REGULATORY CHANGES TO THE SECURITIES ACTS 
The differing standards of care applicable to brokers and 
investment advisers took on greater significance over time.  
When the Advisers Act was enacted, it was accepted that brokers 
would not be covered by the Act, even though they did offer some 
advice to customers.  At the time, the SEC’s General Counsel 
offered his opinion on the topic:  
Clause (C) of Section 202(a)(11) amounts to a recognition that 
brokers and dealers commonly give a certain amount of advice 
to their customers in the course of their regular business, and 
that it would be inappropriate to bring them within the scope of 
the Investment Advisers Act merely because of this aspect of 
their business.  On the other hand, that portion of clause (C) 
which refers to ‘special compensation’ amounts to an equally 
clear recognition that a broker or dealer who is specially 
compensated for the rendition of advice should be considered an 
investment adviser and not be excluded from the purview of the 
Act merely because he is also engaged in effecting market 
transactions in securities.100 
 
98 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230–31 (1988). 
99 Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201. 
100 Opinion of General Counsel Relating to Section 202(a)(11)(c), Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 2, 1940 WL 975 (Oct. 28, 1940). 
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Usually, a broker is paid a fee for each transaction placed 
and an investment adviser is paid a management fee, which is a 
percentage of the assets managed.101  The investment adviser’s 
fee is related to the advice and management provided whereas 
the broker’s fee is related to the costs of transacting the trades.102  
The distinctions in the fee structures made it clear that one fee 
structure was directly related to advice and the other was related 
to transaction costs.  Over time, brokers expanded the services 
and fee structures they offered their clients, offering fee-based 
programs and self-directed accounts which had discounted fees.103  
Through the fee-based programs, brokers offered investors “a 
package of brokerage services—including execution, investment 
advice, custodial and recordkeeping services—for a fixed fee or a 
fee based on the amount of assets on account with the broker-
dealer.”104  The self-directed accounts allowed investors to  
purchas[e] execution-only services at a reduced commission 
rate.  These execution-only programs often give customers the 
ability to trade securities over the Internet without the 
assistance of a registered representative.  These programs offer 
customers who do not want or need investment advice the 
ability to trade securities at a lower commission rate.105   
Therefore, brokers were offering their clients fee-based programs, 
transaction-based fee structures in which the client received 
personalized investment advice, and self-directed account 
services where the client paid discounted transaction-based fees. 
The new fee-based programs offered by brokers blurred the 
correlation between fees and advice.  It was no longer clear what 
brokers were charging for when they charged clients an asset-
based fee.  The SEC was concerned that the new fee structures 
offered would bring brokers under the purview of the Advisers 
Act.  The SEC recognized that fees earned in fee-based accounts 
might constitute “special compensation” for advice under the 
 
101 See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 7, at 702 (“Advisory 
firms . . . typically charge asset-based fees . . . .”); Barbara Black, Brokers and 
Dealers—What’s in a Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 35–38 (2005). 
102 See Black, supra note 101. 
103 See id. at 31–32. 
104 Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, Release No. 
34-42099, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1845, 64 Fed. Reg. 61,226-01, at 
61,228 (proposed Nov. 10, 1999). 
105 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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Advisers Act.106  Further, offering discount services might make 
the fees received in connection with full service accounts “special 
compensation.”107  “This is because the difference between full 
service and execution-only commission rates represents a clearly 
definable portion of a brokerage commission that is attributable, 
at least in part, to investment advice.”108  However, the SEC did 
not believe  
that Congress intended these programs, which are not 
substantially different from traditional brokerage 
arrangements, to be subject to the Act.  While in 1940 the form 
of compensation a broker-dealer received may have been a 
reliable distinction between brokerage and advisory services, 
development of the new brokerage programs suggest strongly 
that it is no longer.109   
The SEC saw the various fee structures as flexibility in the way 
brokers did business—not necessarily as a change in the type of 
advice brokers offered their clients. 
If brought under the Advisers Act, brokers would be held to 
the federal fiduciary duty of investment advisers and would be 
subject to certain other restrictions that the Act imposes.  
Specifically, section 206(3) of the Advisers Act prohibits an 
investment adviser from acting as a principal for his own account 
“without disclosing to such client in writing before the completion 
of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting and 
obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction.”110  The 
practice of acting as a principal on his own account is 
commonplace for brokers and may be disclosed at the completion 
of the trade.111  There is no requirement to disclose such 
information before the completion of the transaction, nor is there 
any requirement to obtain the consent of the client.112  
Restricting brokers in this way would impact the services they 
traditionally offered their clients. 
Fearing that brokers would be subject to the obligations and 
the restrictions set forth in the Advisers Act, the SEC proposed 
retaining the exemption for brokers from the definition of 
 
106 Id. at 61,227. 
107 Id. at 61,228. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012). 
111 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(a)(2) (2013). 
112 See id. 
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investment adviser, notwithstanding that the broker was now 
receiving what might otherwise be considered special 
compensation for advice.113  The SEC focused on the services 
provided by the broker rather than the form of the broker’s 
compensation.  In 2005, the SEC adopted Rule 202(a)(11)-1(a), 
which stated that brokers would not be required to treat 
customers as advisory customers provided the firm met the 
following conditions:  
(i) Any investment advice it provides to an account must be 
solely incidental to the brokerage services provided to the 
account (and thus must be provided on a non-discretionary 
basis); and (ii) advertisements for and contracts, agreements, 
applications and other forms governing its accounts must 
include a prominent statement that the account is a brokerage 
account and not an advisory account, and that the broker-
dealer’s interests may not always be the same as the 
customer’s.114   
Under Rule 202(a)(11)-1(b), “a broker-dealer will not be 
considered to have received special compensation solely because 
the broker-dealer charges one customer a commission, mark-up, 
mark-down or similar fee for brokerage services that is greater 
than or less than one it charges another customer.”115 
Not long after Rule 202(a)(11)-1 was adopted, it was 
challenged in court.  In 2007, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit rejected the SEC’s power to adopt such a rule.116  As 
discussed above, the Advisers Act already exempted brokers from 
the definition of investment adviser so long as the broker did not 
receive special compensation for giving advice.117  However, the 
Advisers Act contained a broader provision, which vested the 
SEC with power to exempt “other persons” from the definition of 
investment adviser.118  The court found that the adoption of Rule 
 
113 Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, Release No. 
34-42099, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1845, 64 Fed. Reg. 61,226-01, at 
61,229 (proposed Nov. 10, 1999). 
114 Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, Release No. 
34-51523, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424-01, at 
20,434 (Apr. 19, 2005). 
115 Id. at 20,436. 
116 Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
117 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012). 
118 At the time, § 202(a)(11)(F) of the Advisers Act exempted from the definition 
of investment adviser “such other persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as 
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202(a)(11)-1 was the SEC’s attempt to expand the exemption for 
brokers by utilizing its broad power to exempt “other persons.”119  
Because Congress had already provided for an express exemption 
for brokers, the SEC could not also exempt them as “other 
persons.”  Therefore, the rule was inconsistent with the 
legislative intent behind the Advisers Act.120 
Once the rule was invalidated, brokers would not be able to 
continue to offer clients a variety of fee structures unless they 
also registered as investment advisers.  At the time of the court 
decision, the SEC estimated that investors held $300 billion in 
one million fee-based brokerage accounts with brokers.121  The 
brokers and the customers had to decide if they wanted to change 
the fee structure of the account so that the broker could continue 
to manage it.  If the client wanted to continue to maintain a fee-
based account, the brokers would have to register as investment 
advisers.  Accordingly, the SEC sought some time, before the 
court’s decision would become effective, “to protect the interests 
of those customers and to provide sufficient time for them and 
their brokers to discuss, make, and implement informed 
decisions about the assets in the affected accounts.”122 
As a result of the court’s decision, a number of brokers 
registered as investment advisers.  As of late 2010, 
approximately eighteen percent of all brokerage firms registered 
with FINRA were also registered as investment advisers, and 
approximately thirty-seven percent of FINRA registered 
 
the Commission may designate by rules and regulations or order.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(11)(H) (originally 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(F)). 
119 Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d at 487–90. 
120 The court held that the final rule adopted by the SEC was inconsistent with 
the Advisers Act  
because it fail[ed] to meet either of the two requirements for an exemption 
under subsection (F). First, the legislative “intent” [did] not support an 
exemption for broker-dealers broader than the exemption set forth in the 
text of subsection (C); therefore, the final rule [did] not meet the statutory 
requirement that exemptions under subsection (F) be consistent with the 
“intent” of paragraph 11 of section 202(a). Second, because broker-dealers 
[were] already expressly addressed in subsection (C), they [were] not “other 
persons” under subsection (F); therefore the SEC [could] use its authority 
under subsection (F) to establish new, broader exemptions for broker-
dealers.  
Id. at 488. 
121 Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients, 
Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2653, 91 SEC Docket 1915, 2007 WL 2778648, 
at *5 (Sept. 24, 2007). 
122 Id. at *2. 
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brokerage firms had an investment adviser affiliate.123  These 
firms offer clients a variety of services.  As a result, clients may 
end up having several different types of accounts with the firm 
and may receive advice from “dual-hatted” personnel who are 
both brokers and investment advisers.124  The individual will be 
subject to either brokerage firm regulation or investment adviser 
regulation based on the services offered.125 
The SEC remained concerned that dual registration would 
impact brokers’ ability to offer a full range of investment options 
to their clients because of the restrictions on principal trading.  
The SEC adopted temporary rule 206(3)-3T, which offered an 
alternative means for investment advisers who were also brokers 
to meet the disclosure and consent requirements of section 206(3) 
of the Advisers Act when they act in a principal capacity in 
transactions with certain of their advisory clients.126  The rule 
allows investment advisers to orally disclose the fact that they 
are acting in a principal capacity, rather than in writing, so long 
as certain other conditions are met.127  Theoretically, this rule 
provides more flexibility to investment advisers who are also 
brokers in terms of the way they do business with their clients. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 SEC STUDY, supra note 18, at 12. 
124 Id. at 13. 
125 Id. 
126 Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients, 
2007 WL 2778648, at *5–6. 
127 Id. at *5. 
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IV. LEGISLATIVE PROGRESS 
Between 2007 and 2009, there was significant upheaval in 
the financial services industry128 and the market declined 
considerably.129  The country was embroiled in a financial crisis 
that was deemed the worst crisis since the Great Depression.130  
As a result, Congress considered necessary changes to the 
regulations governing the financial services industry.  The Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act131 was 
signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010.  The 
purpose of Dodd-Frank was “[t]o promote the financial stability 
 
128 In June 2007, two major Bear Stearns hedge funds collapsed. See Press 
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Two Former Bear Stearns Hedge 
Fund Managers with Fraud (June 19, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2008/2008-115.htm. In February 2008, the auction rate securities markets 
failed. See Auction Rate Securities Market: A Review of Problems and Potential 
Resolutions Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 9 (2008) (statement of 
Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission). In March 2008, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 
acquired The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. See Press Release, J.P. Morgan Chase & 
Co., J.P. Morgan Chase to Acquire Bear Stearns (Mar. 16, 2008), available at 
http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=299805. 
In September 2008, Bank of America Corp. acquired Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., AIG 
was bailed out by the U.S. government, and Lehman Bros. Inc. filed bankruptcy. See 
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Reserve Bd. (Sept. 16, 
2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/ 
20080916a.htm; Press Release, Bank of Am., Bank of America Buys Merrill Lynch 
Creating Unique Financial Services Firm (Sept. 15, 2008), available at 
http://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/press-release/corporate-and-financial-news/b 
ank-america-buys-merrill-lynch-creating-unique-financial; Press Release, U.S. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n, Statement Regarding Recent Market Events and Lehman 
Brothers (Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
198.htm. In December 2008, the SEC charged Bernard L. Madoff with a multi-
million dollar ponzi scheme, and Wells Fargo & Co. merged with Wachovia Corp. See 
News Release, Wells Fargo & Co., Wells Fargo and Wachovia Merger Completed 
(Jan. 1, 2009), available at https://www.wellsfargo.com/press/2009/20090101_Wacho 
via_Merger; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Bernard L. 
Madoff for Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi Scheme (Dec. 11, 2008), available at 
http://sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-293.htm. 
129 Between October 2007 and March 2009, the DOW Jones Industrial Average 
dropped by more than fifty percent of its value. See Peter A. McKay, Dow Is Off 
7,401.24 Points From Its Record High in ‘07, WALL ST. J. (March 3, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123599406229708501.html. 
130 THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xv (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. 
131 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to 
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for 
other purposes.”132 
The law as enacted was a compromise between the House 
and the Senate versions.  Both the House and the Senate 
versions addressed changes to the standards of conduct 
applicable to brokers and investment advisers.133  “The House 
approach was to harmonize the fiduciary standard for brokers, 
dealers, and investment advisers.  The Senate approach was to 
have the SEC conduct a study to evaluate the effectiveness of 
existing standards of conduct for brokers, dealers, and 
investment advisers . . . .”134 
Section 913 of Dodd-Frank is entitled, “Study and 
Rulemaking Regarding Obligations of Brokers, Dealers, and 
Investment Advisors.”135  Pursuant to subsection (b), the SEC is 
required to conduct a study to evaluate:  
(1) the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of 
care for brokers, dealers, investment advisers, persons 
associated with brokers or dealers, and persons associated with 
investment advisers for providing personalized investment 
advice and recommendations about securities to retail 
customers imposed by the Commission and a national securities 
association, and other Federal and State legal or regulatory 
standards; and  
(2) whether there are legal or regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or 
overlaps in legal or regulatory standards in the protection of 
retail customers relating to the standards of care for brokers, 
dealers, investment advisers, persons associated with brokers or 
dealers, and persons associated with investment advisers for 
providing personalized investment advice about securities to 
retail customers that should be addressed by rule or statute.136 
 
 
132 Id. at pmbl. 
133 MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT OF BROKERS, DEALERS, AND 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS 5 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R41381.pdf. 
134 Id. (footnote omitted). 
135 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act § 913. 
136 Id. § 913(b). 
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Section 913 sets forth fourteen items that the SEC was to 
consider when conducting the study and includes a catchall of 
anything not explicitly set forth that the SEC deems necessary 
and appropriate.137 
A. The SEC Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers 
Over the next several months, the SEC conducted the study 
as required by Dodd-Frank.  The SEC issued its report, the 
“Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers” (the 
“Study”), to Congress in January 2011.138  The Study examined 
the fourteen different items, as directed by Dodd-Frank.139  It 
examined the current landscape of regulation of both brokers and 
investment advisers and the perceptions of investors.140  It made 
a number of recommendations, most notably to harmonize the 
standards of care applicable to brokers and investment 
advisers.141  As discussed in further detail below, this 
recommendation is inadequate to address investors’ confusion 
over the responsibilities and obligations of the person with whom 
they are investing because it does not create an ongoing fiduciary 
duty on the part of brokers. 
The Study recognized the differences in the regulatory 
framework for investment advisers and brokers.  As discussed 
above, the main difference in the standard of conduct between 
the two is that investment advisers are held to a fiduciary duty 
and brokers generally are not.  The fiduciary duty of an 
investment adviser includes both the duty of loyalty as well as 
the duty of care.  On the other hand, the law and custom 
applicable to brokers is based on fairness.  “Actions taken by the 
broker-dealer that are not fair to the customer must be disclosed 
in order to make this implied representation of fairness not 
misleading.”142  The Study described the limited instances in 
which courts will find that brokers are subject to the fiduciary 
duty:  “Generally, courts have held that broker-dealers that 
exercise discretion or control over customer assets, or have a  
 
 
137 Id. § 913(c). 
138 See generally SEC STUDY, supra note 18. 
139 Id. at 1. 
140 See id. at 5–101. 
141 See id. at 108–10. 
142 Id. at 51. 
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relationship of trust and confidence with their customers, owe 
customers a fiduciary duty.”143  However, there is no federal 
fiduciary duty created by the 1934 Act. 
According to the Study, the extent of the broker’s duties 
stems from the nature of the relationship with the investor.  For 
example, addressing conflict of interest disclosures, the Study 
noted that if the broker processes orders but does not recommend 
securities or solicit customers, the material information to be 
disclosed is narrow and relates only to the consummation of the 
transaction.144  Such a broker would not have to disclose 
information about the security or its own economic self-interest 
in the transaction.145  But, if the broker recommends a security, it 
must “give honest and complete information” and must disclose 
“material adverse facts of which it is aware.”146  Generally 
speaking, when recommending a security, the broker must 
disclose its own economic interests in the trade, such as whether 
it will be acting as a principal, third-party compensation paid, 
whether there is revenue sharing for a mutual fund, and the 
expenses related to the class of security offered.147  The Study 
concluded that such disclosure “allows customers to verify the 
terms of their transactions and provides disclosure on potential 
conflicts of interest.”148 
In addition to making certain disclosures when completing 
transactions, a broker also has a duty to ensure that any 
recommendation he makes to a client is suitable.  The Study 
addressed what it deems three approaches to suitability under 
common law: reasonable basis suitability, customer specific 
suitability, and quantitative suitability.149  Under the first, the 
broker must have investigated the security and have adequate 
information concerning the security recommended.150  Under the 
second, the broker must make inquiry concerning the investor 
and make a recommendation based on the investor’s response.151  
Under the third, a broker that maintains actual or de facto 
 
143 Id. at 54. 
144 Id. at 55. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 See id. at 55–56. 
148 See id. at 57. 
149 See id. at 63. 
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control over an investor’s account is required to have a basis to 
believe the amount of trading in the investor’s account is 
suitable.152  This obligation to ensure that a recommendation is 
suitable for the investor is explicit in the FINRA Rules.153 
The Study also examined several sources of information 
regarding investor perception of a broker’s duties, concluding 
that investors were confused about the distinctions between 
brokers and investment advisers.154  Through comments the SEC 
publicly solicited, many investors stated that they did not 
understand the standards of care applicable to investment 
advisers and brokers, found the standards of care confusing, and 
were uncertain about the meaning of the multiple titles used by 
investment advisers and brokers.155  Siegel & Gale, LLC and Gelb 
Consulting Group, Inc. were retained by the SEC in 2004 to 
conduct focus group testing.156  The focus group participants 
raised the same issues as those raised by investors in the 
publicly solicited comments, namely that they did not understand 
that the roles and legal obligations of investment advisers and 
brokers are different and that the different titles used are 
confusing.157  The participants also did not understand terms 
such as “fiduciary.”158 
In 2006, the SEC retained RAND Corporation (“RAND”) to 
conduct a study of brokers and investment advisers.159  RAND 
noted that it could be difficult for investors to understand the 
differences in the services provided by financial firms as the 
information was not presented uniformly.160  For example, some 
firms provided so much information to investors that it would be 
difficult for the investors to process it all, and other firms 
provided scant information to investors.161  RAND also found that 
the firms believed investors tend to trust a particular firm 
without necessarily understanding the firm’s services and 
 
152 Id. at 64. 
153 See FINRA Rule 2111 (2011). 
154 SEC STUDY, supra note 18, at 94. 
155 See id. 
156 Id. at 95. 
157 Id. at 96. 
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160 Id. at 97. 
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responsibilities.162  RAND came to the conclusion that the 
“financial services market had become more complex over the 
last few decades in response to market demands for new products 
and services and the regulatory environment.”163 
The SEC also considered a survey conducted by industry 
advocates and certain industry groups.164  The results of that 
survey again suggested that investors do not understand the 
differences between investment advisers and brokers, nor do they 
understand that there are differing standards of conduct related 
to each.165 
Overall, the Study found that, based on these comments, 
studies, and surveys, investors do not understand the differences 
between investment advisers and brokers.  This lack of 
understanding is compounded by the fact that many investors 
may not have the “sophistication, information, or access needed 
to represent themselves effectively in today’s market and to 
pursue their financial goals.”166  The Study concluded that  
it is important that retail investors be protected uniformly when 
receiving personalized investment advice or recommendations 
about securities regardless of whether they choose to work with 
an investment adviser or a broker-dealer.  It also is important 
that the personalized securities advice to retail investors be 
given in their best interests, without regard to the financial or 
other interest of the financial professional, in accordance with a 
fiduciary standard.167 
As discussed above, the purpose of conducting the Study was 
to determine whether there were inadequacies within the 
standards of care applicable to brokers and investment advisers.  
Based on the information gathered in the Study, the SEC staff 
made the following key recommendation with respect to 
standardizing the conduct of brokers and investment advisers:  
The Commission should engage in rulemaking to implement the 
uniform fiduciary standard of conduct for broker-dealers and 
investment advisers when providing personalized investment 
advice about securities to retail customers.  Specifically, the 
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Staff recommends that the uniform fiduciary standard of 
conduct established by the Commission should provide that:   
[T]he standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and 
investment advisers, when providing personalized investment 
advice about securities to retail customers (and such other 
customers as the Commission may by rule provide), shall be to 
act in the best interest of the customer without regard to the 
financial or other interest of the broker, dealer, or investment 
adviser providing the advice.168 
The Study explained that the duties of loyalty and care that 
are encompassed in the standard of care owed by investment 
advisers must be included in this uniform fiduciary duty.169  The 
duty of loyalty is a fundamental aspect of the fiduciary standard 
under the Advisers Act.170  To comply with the duty of loyalty, 
brokers would have to eliminate or disclose material conflicts of 
interest.171  Commission-based compensation does not violate the 
fiduciary standard.172  Nor does the fiduciary standard require 
that a broker have a continuing duty of care or loyalty after the 
investment advice has been given.173  This is a key departure 
from the standard of care applicable to investment advisers.  The 
fiduciary duty described by the case law discussed above 
presumes that the investment adviser will provide advice on an 
ongoing basis.  However, the recommendation made within the 
Study specifically states that it would not require brokers to 
provide ongoing advice.174 
The Study expected that the uniform fiduciary standard 
would overlay the existing investment adviser and broker 
regimes to supplement, not supplant, them.175  It balanced 
concerns about the impact of regulatory change on investor 
access to low-cost products and services by not per se eliminating 
particular products, services, or compensation schemes.176  The 
Study did not discuss how the absence of an ongoing duty to 
provide advice would address the confusion on the part of 
investors over the differences between brokers and investment 
 
168 Id. at 109–10. 
169 See id. at 106–07, 110–11. 
170 Id. at 112. 
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advisers.  Although the Study termed it a “uniform” duty, there 
remain clear distinctions between the duty as it will apply to 
brokers and investment advisers. 
In its guidance, Congress directed the SEC as to which 
sections of the Advisers Act the SEC should look to incorporate 
when considering the standards of care applicable to brokers and 
investment advisers.  Section 913(g) of Dodd-Frank required the 
SEC to consider a fiduciary standard no less stringent than 
sections 206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act; however, it omitted 
206(3), which refers to principal trading.177  This is the same 
section of the Advisers Act that the SEC modified through the 
temporary rule adoption.  The Study recognized that principal 
trading has the potential for raising conflicts of interest.178  The 
Study recommended that, at a minimum, under a uniform 
fiduciary standard, a broker should disclose its conflicts of 
interest, but it would not necessarily need to follow the same 
specific notice and consent requirements of the Advisers Act.179  
This would allow brokers to continue to engage in principal 
trading without having to go through the same disclosure and 
consent requirements to which an investment adviser must 
adhere.  The Study recognized that brokers would remain subject 
to the obligations which are set forth through the FINRA rules, 
including those related to suitability, best execution, and fair and 
reasonable pricing and compensation when engaging in principal 
trading.180 
Notwithstanding the recommendations made by the SEC 
staff, it has not yet issued any new rules or regulations on this 
topic. 
V. MOVING FORWARD 
In 1934, Congress recognized that it could not remain 
inactive while the securities markets changed around it.  In 
2010, following the second major financial crisis, Congress once 
again attempted to address concerns regarding the regulation of 
 
177 Compare Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) with Investment Advisers Act of 
1940, ch.686, § 206(3), 54 Stat. 847, 852 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) 
(2012)). 
178 See SEC STUDY, supra note 18, at 118. 
179 Id. at 120. 
180 Id. 
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the financial services industry.  It is clear that the brokers and 
investment advisers of today are not the brokers and investment 
counselors of the 1920s and 1930s.  The legislation coming out of 
the Great Depression was aimed at addressing the concerns of 
the time.  With respect to brokers, these concerns were focused 
on firms extending credit in an imprudent manner.  There was 
some recognition of the need for disclosure, especially when 
brokers were acting for their own accounts in addition to their 
customers’ accounts.  However, a broker was not the person to 
whom an investor went for broad advice.  That role was played by 
investment counselors.  Congress recognized at the time that 
investment counselors were primarily used by individuals with 
larger accounts, who were looking for personalized investment 
advice.  Investment counselors themselves expected that they 
should be acting at all times in their clients’ best interest.  They 
expected that they should be segregated from incentives that 
might put their own interests ahead of their clients. 
Over time, the relationship between investors and financial 
professionals has changed.  More and more investors do not even 
realize that there is a distinction between brokers and 
investment advisers.  While some may assert that this is an issue 
of investor education, it is more of an issue of how brokers and 
investment advisers are holding themselves out to the public.  
The SEC recognized the increase in overlap between brokers and 
investment advisers when it sought to exempt brokers who 
offered fee-based accounts from the Advisers Act’s coverage.  
Although the exemption was overturned by the D.C. Circuit 
Court, the result was not clarity for investors.  Instead, many 
brokers registered as investment advisers so that they could 
continue to offer flexible fee structures for their clients. 
As the studies have shown, investors do not understand the 
different roles brokers and investment advisers play, nor do they 
understand the different regulatory structures governing each.  
As explained by the Treasury Department: 
  Retail investors are often confused about the differences 
between investment advisers and broker-dealers.  Meanwhile, 
the distinction is no longer meaningful between a disinterested 
investment advisor and a broker who acts as an agent for an 
investor; the current laws and regulations are based on 
antiquated distinctions between the two types of financial 
professionals that date back to the early 20th century.  Brokers 
are allowed to give “incidental advice” in the course of their 
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business, and yet retail investors rely on a trusted relationship 
that is often not matched by the legal responsibility of the 
securities broker.  In general, a broker-dealer’s relationship 
with a customer is not legally a fiduciary relationship, while an 
investment adviser is legally its customer’s fiduciary. 
  From the vantage point of the retail customer, however, an 
investment adviser and a broker-dealer providing “incidental 
advice” appear in all respects identical.  In the retail context, 
the legal distinction between the two is no longer meaningful.  
Retail customers repose the same degree of trust in their 
brokers as they do in investment advisers, but the legal 
responsibilities of the intermediaries may not be the same. 181 
Brokers have infiltrated the investment adviser world.  The 
same individual may act as both a broker and an investment 
adviser for the same client, albeit with respect to different 
accounts.  At the time the SEC conducted its Study in 2010, 
approximately eighty-eight percent of investment adviser 
representatives were also registered as brokers with FINRA.182  
The benefit they offer to clients is most clearly evidenced by the 
flexibility in compensation structures they are able to offer their 
clients.  If a client just wants trade execution, he can use a 
discount broker, which may involve the client placing trades 
himself through an online account.  This tends to be the cheapest 
means of utilizing the services of a broker.  If a client wants more 
advice, he can utilize the services of full-service broker, who will 
be bound by FINRA’s suitability rules and offer advice as 
appropriate on a transaction-by-transaction basis.  If the client 
wants full service, including monitoring of his accounts between 
transactions, he can utilize the advisory services of the firm and 
be charged an annual fee which is based on the net assets in the 
account.  Theoretically, a larger account would need more 
oversight, justifying higher fees.  It is unrealistic to expect that 
brokers will give up these options to once again fit into the role 
envisioned when the 1934 Act was adopted.  It is unlikely that 
investors would want this as well.  One must believe that, at 
least on some level, the supply of various levels of service flowed 
from an expressed demand for such variety. 
 
181 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION 71 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/ 
FinalReport_web.pdf. 
182 SEC STUDY, supra note 18, at 12. 
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However, simply because the services offered by brokers now 
overlap with the role of investment advisers in some 
circumstances does not mean the Advisers Act should apply to 
brokers.  There are certainly situations in which it would be 
appropriate to subject brokers to the obligations set forth in the 
Advisers Act.  However, without a private right of action, the 
added protection to investors would be minimal. 
What is needed is a new regulatory scheme, which 
recognizes the differing levels of services offered to clients by 
brokers and investment advisers, namely, a Financial Advice Act.  
The proposed legislation would apply to both investment advisers 
and brokers, thereby eliminating the false distinction between 
the two.  The duties applicable to the financial professional would 
vary based on the services being offered and the prices being paid 
by the investors, not on the fee structure of the account.  The 
proposed legislation must include both a duty of loyalty and a 
duty of care, which apply to all accounts, regardless of the fees 
paid.  The duties may be limited in time when the account is a 
trading account, where the investor seeks no advice, but the 
duties should be ongoing when the investor does seek advice 
about investing.  It seems counterintuitive that an investor 
would seek advice concerning what to purchase and when, but 
should not expect advice about when to sell the investment.  The 
proposed legislation should recognize the position of trust 
financial professionals hold and should cover acts of negligence 
as well as fraud, as the Advisers Act has done. 
Investors should retain the ability to choose how they want 
to interact with their financial professionals.  The proposed 
legislation should aim at providing investors protection against 
unscrupulous investment “professionals” who seek to earn a 
profit at the detriment of their clients.  However, the proposed 
legislation must allow legitimate financial professionals to do 
business.  Investors should be provided with disclosures that 
outline the legislative protections they will receive with each 
level of service.  However, if a financial professional acts as if the 
investor belongs to a higher category of service, the investor 
should be provided the heightened protections afforded to 
investors in that higher category.  There should be explicit 
guidance within the proposed legislation about which sorts of 
conflicts must be avoided and which may be disclosed.  The  
 
FINAL_LAZARO 2/27/2014  6:21 PM 
414 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:381   
proposed legislation should contain an express private right of 
action, firmly establishing a federal scheme of investor 
protection. 
While investor education is an important component to an 
effective regulatory scheme, it should not be the key component.  
Investors should not be relegated to the atmosphere of caveat 
emptor that existed prior to the enactment of federal securities 
legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
The current regulatory scheme governing brokers and 
investment advisers has not accounted for the changes in the 
professions over the past ninety years.  At the time the 1934 Act 
and the Advisers Act were enacted, there were clear distinctions 
between brokers and investment advisers.  Those distinctions no 
longer exist.  Accordingly, the regulations governing each must 
be truly harmonized.  The most effective way to create a 
harmonized standard of care is to create new legislation that 
recognizes that the existing distinctions are false.  To do 
otherwise will perpetuate the false distinctions to the disservice 
of the investing public. 
 
